Formal methods for software development have made great strides in the last two decades, to the point that their application in safety-critical embedded software is an undeniable success. Their extension to non-critical software is one of the notable forthcoming challenges. For example, C programmers regularly use inline assembly for low-level optimizations and system primitives. This usually results in rendering state-ofthe-art formal analyzers developed for C ineffective. We thus propose TINA, the first automated, generic, verification-friendly and trustworthy lifting technique turning inline assembly into semantically equivalent C code amenable to verification, in order to take advantage of existing C analyzers. Extensive experiments on real-world code (including GMP and ffmpeg) show the feasibility and benefits of TINA.
I. INTRODUCTION
Context. Formal methods for the development of high-safety software have made tremendous progress over the last two decades [1] , [2] , [3] , [4] , [5] , [6] , with notable success in regulated safety-critical industrial areas such as avionics, railway or energy. Yet, the application of formal methods to more usual (non-regulated) software, for safety or security, currently remains a scientific challenge. In particular, extending the applicability from a world with strict coding guidelines and disciplined mandatory validation processes to more liberal and diverse development and coding practices is a difficult task.
Problem. We consider here the issue of analyzing "mixed code", focusing on the use of inline assembly in C/C ++ code. This feature allows to embed assembly instructions in C/C ++ programs. It is supported by major C/C ++ compilers like GCC, clang or Visual Studio, and used quite regularly -usually for optimization or to access system-level features hidden by the host language. For example, we estimate that 11% of Debian packages written in C/C++ directly or indirectly depends on inline assembly, with chunks containing up to 500 instructions, while 28% of the top rated C projects on GitHub contains inline assembly according to Rigger et al. [7] . As a matter of fact, inline assembly is a common engineering practice in key areas such as cryptography, multimedia or drivers. However, it is not supported by current state-of-the-art C/C ++ program analyzers, like KLEE [4] or Frama-C [1] , possibly leading to incorrect or incomplete results. This is a clear applicability issue for advanced code analysis techniques.
Given that developing dedicated analyzers from scratch is too costly, the usual way of dealing with assembly chunks is to write either equivalent host code (e.g, C/C ++ ) or equivalent logical specification when available. But this task is handled manually in both cases, precluding regular analysis of large code bases: manual translation is indeed time-consuming and error-prone. The bigger the assembly chunks are, the bigger these problems loom.
Goal and challenges. We address the challenge of designing and developing an automated and generic lifting technique turning inline assembly into semantically equivalent C code amenable to verification. The method should be: Verification-friendly The produced code should allow good enough analyses in practice (informally dubbed verifiability), independently of the underlying analysis techniques (e.g., symbolic execution [8] , [9] , deductive verification [10] , [11] or abstract interpretation [12] ); Widely applicable It should not be tied to a particular architecture, assembly dialect or compiler chain, and yet handle a significant subset of assembly chunks found in the wild; Trustworthy The translation process should be insertable in a formal verification context without endangering soundness: as such it should maintain exactly all behaviors of the mixed code, and provide a way to show this property. Verifiability alone is already challenging: indeed, straightforward lifting from assembly to C (keeping the untyped byte-level view) does not ensure it as standard C analyzers are not well equipped to deal with such low-level C code.
Scarce previous attempts do not fulfill all the objectives above. Vx86 [13] is tied to both the x86 architecture and deductive verification, while the recent work by Corteggiani et al. [14] focuses on symbolic execution. None of them addresses verifiability or trust. At first sight, decompilation techniques [15] , [16] , [17] may seem to fit the bill. Yet, as they mostly aim at helping reverse engineers, correctness is not their main concern. Actually, "existing decompilers frequently produce decompilation that fails to achieve full functional equivalence with the original program" [18] . Some recent works partially target this issue: Schwartz et al. [19] do not demonstrate correctness (they instead measure a certain degree of it via testing), while Schulte et al. [18] use a correct-bydesign but intractable (possibly non-terminating) search-based method. Again, none of them study verifiability.
Proposal. We propose TINA (Taming Inline Assembly), the first automated, generic, verification-friendly and trustworthy lifting technique for inline assembly. The main insight behind TINA is that by focusing on inline assembly rather than arbitrary decompilation, we tackle a problem both more restricted (simple control-flow, smaller size) and better defined (interfaces with C code, no dynamic jumps), paving the way to powerful targeted methods. TINA relies on the following key principles:
• Recent binary-code lifters [20] , [21] , [22] translating binary opcodes to generic low-level intermediate representations (IR) provide minimalist architecture-agnostic and well-tested IRs adapted to our goal; • While direct byte-level lifting severely hinders current C analyzers, verifiability is enhanced by dedicated transformations refining the raw original IR with C-like abstractions such as explicit variables, arithmetic data manipulation, structured control-flow, etc.; • Trust relies on translation validation [23] (validating each translation), a more tractable option than full translator validation, which reduces the trust base to a (usually simpler) checker. Here, this checker requires to prove program equivalence -a notoriously hard problem 1 .
We propose a dedicated equivalence checking algorithm tailored to our processing chain.
Contributions. In summary, this paper makes the following contributions:
• A new cooperating toolchain allowing formal verification of programs mixing inline assembly and C, based on an original combination of novel and existing components (Sec. IV), addressing verifiability and trust issues; • A new principled method lifting inline assembly to highlevel C amenable to further formal analysis built upon 4 simplification steps (Sec. V) countering clearly identified threats to verifiability (Sec. II); • The automated validation of said method to make the lifter trustworthy, via a new dedicated program equivalence checking algorithm taking advantage of our transformation process to achieve both efficiency and high success rate, with a limited trust base (Sec. VI) ; • Thorough experiments (Sec. VII) of a prototype implementation on real-world examples to show its wide applicability (all Debian GNU/Linux 8.11 x86 assembly chunks, some ARM, GCC and clang) and its substantial impact on 3 different verification techniques on samples from GMP, ffmpeg, ALSA and libyuv.
Discussion. This work targets assembly chunks as found in real-world programs: we lift and validate 76% of all assembly chunks from Linux Debian 8.11 (Table I) and benefit a range of state-of-the-art verification tools and techniques (Sec. VII-B).
Still, system and floating-point instructions are currently considered out-of-scope. Especially, floats are not tackled here since handling them well is a challenge in itself for the whole toolchain (lifter, solver, verifier) -see the extended discussion in Sec. VIII. Also, TINA's implementation targets C since this is the principal language used for low-level programs, but the method itself would work unchanged on similar imperative languages, like LLVM. Finally, though some prior work has addressed code lifting for verification, it is worth noting that verifiability has never been explicitly addressed so far.
II. CONTEXT AND MOTIVATION
Consider the code snippet of Fig. 1a extracted from UD-PCast sources. It consists of the x86 assembly code itself (here: "cld; rep stosl") together with a specification linking C variables to registers and declaring inputs, outputs and clobbers (i.e., registers or memory cells possibly modified by the assembly chunk). The compiler, upon encounter of such an (extended) assembly chunk, may use this specification -for example during register allocation. However, it is fully blind to the rest of the information (e.g., mnemonics) and will forward the chunk as is until code emission.
Annotation. The code in Fig. 1a is suffixed by a specification, written in a concise constraint language (GCC/clang syntax), in zones separated by ':' (lines 16-23):
• It first describes allocation constraints for output variables:
"0". "=c" ( __ d0) specifies that variable __ d0 should be assigned to register ecx; "1". "=D" ( __ d1) specifies that variable __ d1 should be assigned to register edi;
• Then, lines 20-22 detail inputs: "a" (eax) holds 0, sizeof(fd _ set) / sizeof( __ fd _ mask) is held in the register described in "0" (ecx) and the one described in "1" (edi) holds &((read _ set)-> __ fds _ bits)[0]; • Finally, the whole memory ("memory") can be assigned.
This basically tells the compiler to flush its memory cache before entering the chunk.
Informal semantics. The code "cld; rep stosl" has the following informal semantics ( Fig. 1b ): put the direction flag df to 0, then fill ecx double words from the edi pointer with the value from eax. Intel's manual [24] explains that df drives the sign of the increment: when df is 0, the sign is positive. TINA produces the code in Fig. 1c : the loop from the informal semantics is there, but the lifter optimized away (see Sec. V) elements like df, eax or edi.
Running the analyzers. If we try to run industrial-strength C code analyzers on this code, we observe erratic behaviors: KLEE [4] stops with an error message; Frama-C, on the other hand, warns that 'Clobber list contains "memory" argument.
Assuming no side-effect beyond those mentioned in output operands'.
This message is clear but the behavior incorrect: the keyword "memory" stipulates that all memory may be assigned but Frama-C simply ignores it. This small example shows that a single line of assembly may throw off these tools. Of course, one may manually rewrite the chunks into semantically equivalent C code, then use C analyzers, but this is error-prone and not ("cld; rep; " "stosl" 19 : "=c" ( __ d0), "=D" ( __ d1) 20 : "a" (0), 21 "0" (sizeof(fd _ set) / sizeof( __ fd _ mask)), scalable. With TINA, we are able to automatically generate the code of Fig. 1c , illustrative of our code transformations (see Sec. V), and automatically validate it (trustworthy). We can then formally show with Frama-C [1], using abstract interpretation or deductive verification, that the code indeed verifies the informal semantics laid out before (verification-friendly).
Identified threats to verifiability. Straightforward lifting from assembly to C (keeping the untyped byte-level view) does not ensure verifiability, as standard C analyzers are not well equipped to deal with such low-level C code. For example we cannot prove with Frama-C that a basic lifting of Fig. 1a meets its specification. We identify 3 main threats to verifiability: T1. Low-level data: explicit flags -including overflows or carry, bitwise operations (masks), low-level comparisons, byte-level memory; T2. Implicit variables: variables in the untyped byte-level stack, packing of separate logical variables inside large-enough registers; T3. Implicit loop counters/index: structures indexed by loop counters at high-level are split into multiple low-level computations where the link between the different logical elements is lost. Experiments in Sec. VII-B demonstrate that a straightforward encoding (BASIC) fails to get the best of any analysis -symbolic execution, abstract interpretation, or deductive verification.
Properties of inline assembly. TINA exploits the following properties, specific to inline assembly: P1. The control flow structure is limited: only a handful of conditionals and loops, hosting up to hundreds of instructions; P2. The interface of the chunk with the C code is usually given: programmers annotate chunks with the description of its inputs, outputs and clobbers with respect to its C context; P3. Furthermore, the chunk appears in a C context, where the types, and possibly more, are known: this kind of information is sought after in decompilers, using heuristics, whereas we only need to propagate it here. All in all, the above points show that lifting assembly chunks is actually an interesting sub-problem of general decompilation, both simpler and richer in information and thus significantly more amenable to overall success.
III. BACKGROUND

A. Inline Assembly
We focus here on inline assembly in C/C ++ code as supported by GCC and clang. MASM (Microsoft Macro Assembler) has a different syntax but works similarly.
Assembly chunks in the GAS syntax of GCC have two flavors: basic and (recommended) extended (see Fig. 2 ). Basic assembly ( Fig. 2a ) allows the insertion of assembly instructions anywhere in the code. They will be emitted as is during the production of the assembly file. In this case, compilers __ asm __ volatile ("movdqa b, %xmm0\n\t" "movdqa %xmm0, a\n\t");
(a) Basic version __ asm __ ("movdqa %1, %%xmm0\n\t" "movdqa %%xmm0, %0\n\t" : "=m" ( * a) : "m" (b) : "xmm0"); assume the chunk has no effect on its C scope, preventing safe interactions between assembly and C code -yet that does not stop developers from using it when the implicit context looks safe. In Fig. 2a , it is implicitly assumed that no optimization will occur on global variables a and b and that xmm registers are not used by default.
Extended assembly. Extended assembly allows in addition the description of the interactions with C through its inputs, outputs and clobbers (i.e., registers or memory cells whose value is rewritten by the chunk).
Such annotations work like a printf string format, as shown in Fig. 2b : some assembly operands may be replaced by placeholders referring to a list of C operands. The syntax requires binding C operands to location constraints, as in Fig. 1a and 2b. Constraints may also specify more than one location, and let the compiler choose the best way to place this operand. Common placement constraints include r to bind to a general register; m to bind to a memory address; i to an immediate value; and g which means "r, m or i". Operands may be read-only (for inputs) or write-only (for outputs) with the = modifier. A read-write operand is created either by linking an input to the same location as an output ("0" (sizeof(fd _ set) / sizeof( __ fd _ mask)) in Fig. 1a ) or by using the + modifier instead of =. Without special modifiers, compilers assume read-only operands are consumed before write-only operands are produced, so that these may share the same locations. The clobber list may also contain keywords like "memory" (arbitrary memory cells may be read and/or written) and "cc" (conditional flags will be changed).
The specification of inputs, outputs and clobbers stands as a contract between the chunk and the compiler. Compilers are totally blind to what actually happens inside the chunk, relying on the contract, and will not warn about mistakes inside the chunk. Forgetting to list an input or a clobber is an easy mistake that can result in code which does not behave as expected.
Adoption. The use of inline assembly is pretty widespreadwe estimate that 11% of Debian packages written in C/C++ directly or indirectly depends on inline assembly. It includes major projects like GMP and ffmpeg -Rigger et al. [7] actually reports that 28% of the top rated C projects on GitHub uses inline assembly. We further estimate that 75% of the chunks found in Debian Jessie 8.11 (used in Sec. VII-A) serve an optimizing purpose, with an average size of approximately 10 instructions, and up to 341. Inline assembly is often used in conjunction with C macros or inlineable functions to be specialized by the compiler at each location.
B. Binary-code lifters
Binary-code lifters are the cornerstones of modern binarylevel analyzers. They are used to abstract the different binary Instruction Set Architectures (ISA) and formats into a single intermediate representation (IR) [20] , [21] , [22] . We rely on the IR of BINSEC [25] , called DBA -other IRs are similar. Its syntax is shown in Fig. 3 . DBA is a minimalist language, comprising only two types of elements (bitvector values and memory) and three instructions: assignments, jumps and conditionals. Yet, this is enough to encode the functional semantics of major ISAs -including x86 and ARM.
Binary lifters provide specialized decoders for supported architectures, in the same spirit that a compiler has one code emitter per supported architecture. Lifters are then used in disassembly algorithms to (try to) recover the semantics of the binary program. We use them to disclose the semantics of compiled assembly chunks.
IV. TAMING INLINE ASSEMBLY: AN OVERVIEW
TINA lifts inline assembly to semantically equivalent C taking advantage of properties P1-P3. This original process consists mainly of two (new) phases: verification-friendly lifting and validation, detailed respectively in Sec. V and VI. First, let us discuss the overall approach, as schematized in Fig. 4 .
Compilation. We compile the source code for the target architecture with debug information. Since we control code compilation, we also include all contextual data that can help to reconstruct C code, e.g., variable names and types.
Initial low-level IR lifting [genericity] . We now start the translation per se, by lifting the code back to the IR level. The use of binary code may seem gratuitous at first sight. This is however the best place to start working, since assembly chunks are totally instantiated and embedded in their context -register names and memory locations have been resolved by the compiler. Debug information here allows to locate the assembly chunk in the compiled code.
Transformation into high-level C [verifiability]. We then lift the IR back to C, through a combination of dedicated passes aiming at refining the low-level IR with high-level information (Sec. V). The end result is a C-only code where assembly chunks have been substituted by a lifted C code amenable to verification. This step is original. We locate the binary code corresponding to the lifted code once more, and get back its IR representation. We now possess two distinct IR pieces: this one and the one from the first compilation. We will aim to prove their semantic equivalence in Sec. VI. This step is original.
We have implemented a prototype of TINA leveraging existing tools: Frama-C [1] for C source code manipulation (parsing, localization, C injection), BINSEC [25] , [26] (IR lifting [21] , SMT solvers integration [27] ), and the DWARF [28] debug format to pass information to binaries with the compiler.
V. FROM LOW-LEVEL IR TO HIGH-LEVEL C
The goal of this lifting phase is to recover verifiable C code preserving the semantics of the original assembly chunk. The transformations at IR level mitigate the identified threats to verifiability (Sec. II), and reinforce each other (Sec. VII).
Type verification & propagation. To lift assembly code back to C, chunk operations on bitvectors and memory need to be mapped to C operations on integers (signed/unsigned) and pointers. To this end, we propagate types from the interface into the IR operations. IR types can either be addresses (typed pointers) or values (signed or unsigned, with an associated size). Type information is further synthesized using forward propagation and constraints imposed on operands by low-level operations. This step also guarantees that inputs' and outputs' types are respected. The lifter gives concrete C types using the type size information from DWARF. Register unpacking (threat T2). Assembly chunks often contain optimizations exploiting data level parallelism in order to use the full capacity of the hardware by packing multiple value inside a bigger one fitting inside a machine register. For instance, loading 4 (byte) characters inside an integer is more efficient than doing four smaller loads. The concept has been exacerbated with Single Instruction Multiple Data extensions, providing vectorized registers up to 512-bits. The issue here is that such packed code has very low-level semantics (masks, shifts, etc.). Our novel register unpacking method uncovers the independent variables stored in a container, thus preventing packed arithmetic from destroying the abstractions of the analyzers. The method amounts to splitting registers into independent variables, whose size depends on the uncovered usage, rewrite the code accordingly and then clean up unused variables and code, and rebuild higher-level chunks through dedicated simplifications. The principle is the following: if a subpart of a variable is read in the code (e.g., extract0..15 eax), then this subpart is likely to correspond to a logical entity. So we generate a fresh variable for this entity, receiving the restricted value, and replace each such extraction by this new variable. To avoid the need for a fixpoint until every variable extraction is replaced, we perform the replacement eagerly, in 3 steps:
1) A forward pass where each assignment of 8 × 2 k bits is split into multiple fresh assignments of 8 × 2 i bits where i ≤ k (for instance, eax will be split into {{al, ah, eax _ 16 _ 23, eax _ 24 _ 31}, {ax, eax _ 16 _ 31}, {eax}}; 2) At the same time, each variable restriction extract i..j var corresponding to one of the newly generated variables is replaced by this new variable; 3) A final pass of dead code elimination removes each unused freshly generated variable. Note that subparts may overlap with each other (for instance, al, ax and eax share common parts) but we found that most of the time, only one of them survives the final step. Thus, the size of the produced code does not increase much in the end.
Finally, we also rely on the fact that expression propagations together with concatenation-extraction simplification will automatically reconstruct bigger sized variables from concatenation of smaller sized ones (e.g., ax half-word from al and ah bytes).
In Fig. 5 , the chunk loads two char in a register before adding them, using the h and l prefixes to access them. Without register unpacking, the lifter uses bitmasking (Fig. 5c ), making the code more complex than its clear initial intent (Fig. 5b) . Expression propagation (threats T1 and T2). We draw inspiration from compiler optimization techniques to devise a novel dedicated simplification mechanism geared toward our needs. In particular, we can afford very aggressive simplifications (small code size w.r.t. standard compilation setting) but we have to address particular kinds of low-level instructions (coming from IR translation). Our method originally combines eager expression propagation coupled with dedicated (lowlevel) simplifications and a posteriori control to revert fruitless propagations -when no simplification rule has been triggered.
Eager expression propagation relies on the idea that more expression propagation raises more opportunity for further simplifications by dedicated rules. Yet, systematic propagation can yield an exponential blowup of the code under analysis rather than the desired simplifications. To mitigate this problem we propose eager propagation coupled with a posteriori control to revert fruitless propagation. The algorithm works as follows:
• As a preliminary step, a data flow analysis collects all symbolic values (terms) associated to each pair (name, program point) used in the IR code; • First, we unconditionally propagate symbolic values in a first pass but save a reverse map for each propagated expression (in case the propagation is not fruitful); • Second, we expect simplification rules (described below)
to simplify the whole expression; • Third, we identify expressions not yet simplified (by syntactically comparing the terms before and after simplification) and revert back the propagation on such case thanks to the reverse map (a posteriori control); • Finally, we cleanup the code by filtering out unused variables, dead branches and dead code.
Regarding simplification rules, we use a mixture of standard and dedicated simplification rules -standard for typical integerlevel properties and dedicated for more low-level aspects. Here is a representative (incomplete) subset of these rules where |x| denotes the size of the expression x, any binary operator, C a condition (|C| = 1), k is a constant.
• associativity-commutativity re-ordering:
x + 1 + a → a + x + 1
• constant propagation (modular arithmetic): 10 + 5 → 15, 10 × 2 → 20
• standard algebraic simplifications (identity, neutral, absorbing and inverse elements, etc.): Fig. 6 shows how the addition of rewrite rules exposes the intended semantics of a branchless absolute value computation. Loop normalization (threat T3). This pass aims at highlighting the relations between the current iteration of the loop and the variable values. We especially look for affine relations of the form a × x + b where x is the loop iteration counter. We indeed found out that tools much prefer to analyze for (int i = 0; i < N; i++) T[i] = C; instead of for (char * t = T; t < T + N; t++) * t = C;. Assembly code, though, is more likely to have the second form. We thus transform each self-incrementing (-decrementing) variables of the form v = I; while (...) { ...; v = v + k; } in order to get code more amenable to analysis. The transformation is done in (up to) 3 steps: 1) rebasing replaces the initial value I by 0 and each occurrence of the variable v by I + v; 2) rescaling replaces the increment k by 1 and each occurrence of the variable v by k * v; 3) merging unifies the transformed variables with the loop iteration counter. For example, in Fig. 1c , the byte-level affine relation between the counter ecx, lifted as __ tina _ ecx, and the moving pointer edi, based at __ tina _ 4, is edi ≡ __ tina _ 4 + 4 * ( __ tina _ 3 -ecx)the code is lifted as __ tina _ 4 + ( __ tina _ 3 -__ tina _ ecx) to take pointer arithmetic into account ( __ tina _ 4 is an int * , pointing to 4 bytes long values in x86).
VI. VALIDATION
For our translation to be trustworthy, we use a two-pronged approach: 1) We try to prove the semantic equivalence of the code prior to lifting with the lifted C code; 2) If this fails, we rely on intensive random testing (fuzzing) to increase the level of trust in the lifted C code.
Block-based semantic equivalence. The lifting process of Sec. V strives to preserve the isomorphism of the controlflow graphs based on basic blocks between the initial assembly chunk and its lifted C representation over their DBA IR representation. This property allows us to tackle the equivalence proof at basic block level. The proof of equivalence proceeds as follows: S1. We check the isomorphism of the control-flow graphs extracted from the two lifted programs. Since we deal with deterministic labeled directed graphs, this check is immediate -and usually succeeds. TINA is actually very careful during simplifications and recompilation to preserve the control-flow structure (see details below). For the isomorphism check, we track the relation between the heads of IR basic blocks and the corresponding emitted C code thanks to C labels and debug line information. If the check succeeds, we go to S2, otherwise we [fallback] on fuzzing -in practice (Sec. VII-A), the latter has never happened.
S2. Once we know the two control-flow graphs are isomorphic, we try to demonstrate the pairwise equivalence of corresponding vertices. This allows to avoid directly dealing with loops. Each pairing of basic blocks is translated to logical formulas for which we ask SMT solvers: if inputs are identical, can outputs be different? If all queries are unsatisfiable then equivalence is proven [success], otherwise we use our [fallback].
Taming simplifications. In order to help the equivalence proof succeed, TINA passes were designed to preserve the controlflow graph structure and to be traceable. For the first goal, simplifications never modify jump instruction, except for trivial dead branch elimination and the lifter avoids inserting branches with lazy constructions such as &&, || or ternary operators. For the second goal, when a simplification changes the input-output relation of a basic block, it records the changes w.r.t the old ones and these properties will be added to the assumptions of S2. For instance, in Fig. 1 , the expression propagation records that eax holds the value 0 for the entire chunk. It will then be used during S2 to prove the equivalence of the loop body where the register no longer exists in the generated part (Fig. 1c) .
What could go wrong? While TINA uses simplifications and lifting passes tailored to make the block-based semantic equivalence algorithm possible, the recompilation step is blind to this requirement and may therefore threaten it.
The S1 check may fail if the compiler modifies the control flow graph, for example if some elements outside of the assembly chunk render a branch dead or a loop unrollable. In Fig. 1c , since sizeof is known at compile time, clang -O1 unrolls the loop, making the isomorphism check fail.
The S2 query may fail if the compiler moves parts of the computation across basic blocks, changing the relation between inputs and outputs. It may happen during code motions, like loop-invariant code motions. In this case, the graph isomorphism still holds but the relation between basic blocks is lost. GCC -funroll-loops partially unrolls (8 times) the loop body in Fig. 1c leading to a failed equivalence query.
To avoid such problems, we recompile the code without any optimization (-O0).
Note that SMT checks never time out in our experiments (Sec. VII), probably due to the naturally small size of blockbased queries. However, we can imagine that code showing hard-to-reverse behaviors, such as cryptographic hash functions, could make the S2 query fail.
Trust base. Validation allows to increase the confidence in the lifting process, using 3 components as the trust base: the binary-code lifter, the compiler and the solver. All are well tested software and the last two are part of the trust base of (most) modern source-level verification tools anyway. Furthermore, while we trust the compiler debug information, we argue that the compilation process itself is not part of the trusted base: assembly chunks are untouched by it and validation will very likely catch errors during re-compilation. Besides, further mitigation includes systematic testing of assembly chunks vs. their IR representation, and using multiple compilers and/or solvers.
VII. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We evaluate our implementation of TINA on 3 research questions: RQ1) How applicable is it on assembly chunks found in the wild? RQ2) How do off-the-shelf program analyzers behave on lifted code? RQ3) What is the impact of each optimization? 
A. Wide applicability (RQ1)
We run our prototype on all assembly chunks found in the Linux Debian 8.11 distribution (for x86), i.e. ≈ 3000 chunks distributed over 200 packages and 1000 functions. As chunk distribution is not smooth, we also fix 2 subsets of samples: one with the 100 biggest chunks, and another with all chunks from 4 key major projects exploiting low-level optimizations: GMP, ffmpeg, ALSA and libyuv. We exclude trivial (empty or unused), out-of-scope and rejected chunks. Out-of-scope chunks include those with floating point operations, OS-level hardware instructions or hardware-based crypto-primitives, like AES. Rejected chunks are those deemed unsafe because they do not respect their interface. Yet, we activate options in our tool to specifically regard accessing flags, xmm registers or memory as safeallowing to consider 150 extra chunks as relevant, notably in ffmpeg. The statistics of Table I report on the tool's behavior with these settings.
On in-scope chunks, TINA performs extremely well, with 100% chunks lifted and fully validated (no resort to testing) -this amounts to 76% of all chunks found -for a negligible cost (0.7s per chunk on average). The biggest 100 chunks are a little less successful as they have a fair amount of (unhandled) floating-point instructions. TINA works equally well on major projects for ARM or x86, and with GCC or clang on x86 (Table II) , confirming its genericity.
B. Adequacy to formal verification tools (RQ2, RQ3)
We select 3 tools representing popular formal techniques currently used in the industry: KLEE [4] for symbolic execution [9] (bug finding), and Frama-C [1] with its EVA plug-in [30] for abstract interpretation [12] , [31] (runtime error verification) and WP plug-in [32] for deductive verification [10] , [11] (functional correctness).
Experiments on both symbolic execution and abstract interpretation use 58 functions (out of 366) from the 4 key projects in Sec. VII-A, selected due to the ease of automatically generating the initial contexts for both analyses. For all 3 tools, we also report the observed differences using a basic lifter and different optimization levels: O1 (high-level predicate recovery), O2 (O1 + register unpacking), O3 (O2 + expression propagation) and O4 (O3 + loop normalization). Note that O4 is TINA. Symbolic execution. We perform our experiments with KLEE [4] which at present does not handle inline assembly chunks and stops upon meeting one -except for a very few simple cases such as assembly-level rotations. This fact can sometimes prevent the adoption of symbolic execution [33] . Table III summarizes our findings. (RQ2) First, KLEE alone can analyze only few functions (3/58) as (almost any block of) assembly stops the analysis, and none of them is fully path-covered. Adding lifting allows to analyze all considered functions (58/58), to completely path-cover 43% of them (25/58) and to explore significantly more paths within the same analysis budget (×4.7).
The lifting strategy (RQ3) does not impact the functions that KLEE can fully cover, but TINA optimizations considerably speed up code exploration, enabling to cover significantly more paths (×4) than basic lifting in the same amount of time. This is explained by TINA-produced code being higherlevel, with fewer instructions and local variables, thereby accelerating SMT-solving. Note that control-flow structure, and thus total number of paths, does not change. Moreover, each optimization step brings some degree of improvement.
The major improvement gaps here are brought by register unpacking (O2) and expression propagation (O3). As expected, loop normalization (O4) has no impact as symbolic execution simply unrolls loops. Additional experiments demonstrates that high-level recovery (O1) has also a substantial impact on the analysis (removing it leads to 5.4M explored paths, vs 6.6M in full TINA).
Abstract interpretation. We use the Frama-C EVA [30] plugin. Frama-C has limited support for inline assembly based on interfaces, translating them into logical assigns annotations for modified variables -safely interpreted in EVA (and WP) as non-deterministic assignments.
Table IV sums up the results for RQ2. Lifting the assembly code with TINA almost always reduces the number of alarms in the common C code (23/27) . This follows from the better precision of the analysis since modified variables in the lifted code are now accessible. In half the cases (11/20), we observe a precision gain on function return values. Most functions (31/34) with return values or initial C alarms show such improvements. The lifted C code also contains new alarms (17/58) which we could not detect before and should be taken into account (usually out-of-bounds or other memory accesses). We also found some possibly buggy behaviors (Sec. VII-D).
For short, we observe positive impact from TINA w.r.t. nonlifted code on 77% (45/58) of the functions (more precision, reducing alarms from over-approximations of inline assembly, or new memory alarms in lifted code) . Table V additionally shows the impact of the lifting strategy (RQ3). Compared with basic lifting, each additional optimization increases the quality of the lifted code (fewer ASM and total alarms) and the precision of the analysis (more functions without alarms, fewer memory alarms, more errors) -including loop normalization which allows finer approximations of loop fixpoints (widening). TINA (O4) thus significantly improves all these aspects. Moreover, the produced alarms are more precise: possible buffer overflows (such as a ffmpeg -1 index access) are now recognized as errors and not mere alarms. Additional experiments demonstrates that removing any of the optimization steps leads us quite far from the whole chain result. Weakest precondition calculus. We use the deductive verification Frama-C plug-in WP [34] , [32] . We take 12 assemblyoptimized functions: 6 excerpts from ffmpeg, GMP, libyuv, libgcrypt and UDPCast, 2 others adapted from optimized assembly snippets and 4 translated examples from ACSL by example [35] . Functional specifications and loop invariants are manually inserted before verification, as usual for WP-based methods -we do not insert any other annotation. Moreover, recall that without lifting, assembly chunks are correctly overapproximated by non-deterministic assignments to the modified C variables. Table VI details our results. The unlifted code does not require invariants (no C-level loops), while lifted codes all require identical invariants as they share the same controlflow structure. A quick glance at Table VI shows that (RQ2) while WP without lifting never succeeds and basic lifting is far from enough (1/12), TINA does allow to prove the functional correctness of all functions (12/12) . The simple over-approximations of assembly chunks provided by Frama-C without lifting are not sufficient to prove properties as strong as functional correctness.
Regarding optimization steps (RQ3), it turns out that loop normalization (O4) has no direct impact since the user must provide manual loop invariants. On the other hand, all other steps are complementary (Table VI) and crucial: removing only one of them yields at best a 6/12 success rate.
C. Conclusion
Experiments show that our code lifting method is highly practical (100% Debian 8.11 in-scope blocks are lifted and validated), that it has a positive and significant impact on all 3 formal verification tools considered -allowing them to effectively handle code with inline assembly, and, finally, that full TINA (O4) is needed to facilitate further code analysesas less refined lifting yields poorer analyses.
Interestingly, all analyses do not behave the same w.r.t the optimization chain: symbolic execution mostly takes advantage of register unpacking and expression simplifications, abstract interpretation is sensitive to the 4 optimization steps and weakest precondition calculus strongly requires all of them but loop normalization -which is already granted by user-supplied loop invariants.
D. Epilogue: post-analysis considerations
We found 567 compliance issues during our experiments. Most have no impact with current compilers but may induce bugs out of compiler changes, maintenance or code reuse.
While evaluating verifiability, we ran into 6 potential buffer overflows hidden in assembly chunks. For example, a ffmpeg function accesses index -1 of its input buffer -this is actually reported in the comments. All errors initially reported by Frama-C EVA were also reproduced with KLEE. After determining and adding relevant logical preconditions, we were able to show the absence of runtime errors in the reported "corrected" functions. Besides, we were able to prove (with Frama-C WP) the functional correctness of 6 functions from the Debian distribution code base, including SumSquareError (24 assembly instructions).
VIII. DISCUSSION
A. Threats to validity
Benchmark representativeness. The considered code base is quantitatively and qualitatively representative of the use of inline assembly: it is extensive and comprises highly popular and respected projects. We mainly experiment on GCC and x86, but our experiments on ARM and clang show our results also hold in these settings. Still, we obviously miss closed-source software and code which relies on Microsoft's C compiler (different assembly syntax). Yet, there is no reason to believe it would behave differently.
Verification methods. We consider three of the most popular verification techniques (symbolic execution, abstract interpretation, deductive verification), representative of the major classes of analysis, both in terms of goal (bug finding, runtime error checking and proving functional correctness) and underlying core technologies (domain propagation, constraint solving & path exploration, first-order reasoning). Also, we rely on wellestablished verification tools, each applied in several successful industrial case studies. Thus, we reckon that our experiments support our claim regarding the general verifiability of the codes TINA produces.
B. Limitations
Our lifting has two main limitations: hardware-related instructions and floating-point operations.
Since we aim to lift assembly chunks back to C, the support of hardware related instructions cannot be achieved outside of modeling hardware in C as well -for example, neither DBA IR nor C can make direct reference to hardware interrupts. Here we probably cannot do better than having two (approximated) C models of hardware instructions, one for over-and one for under-approximations. While not necessarily that difficult for reasonable analysis precision, this is clearly a manpowerintensive task.
The float limitation is primarily due to the lack of support in BINSEC. Adding such support is also manpower-intensive, but not that hard. Yet, the real issue is that efficient reasoning over floats is still ongoing scientific work in both program analysis and automated solvers (e.g., theory support is new in SMT-LIB [36] , only 2 solvers in the relevant category of SMT-COMP 2018). As such, it threatens our validation part, and most program analyzers would not be able to correctly handle these lifted floats anyway. Despite these limits, we still lift and validate 76% of assembly chunks of a standard Linux distribution.
Finally, our technique is amenable, to a certain extent, to standalone assembly code or even binary code decompilation. However, this case can quickly deteriorate to the usual difficult problem of lifting an arbitrary program. Especially, dynamic jumps or large-size complicated CFG would probably yield serious issues.
IX. RELATED WORK
Though some prior work has addressed code lifting for verification, it is worth noting that verifiability has never been explicitly addressed so far. We hereafter review approaches (partly) related to our method.
Assembly code lifting and verification. Maus [13] , [37] proposes a generic method simulating the behavior of assembly instructions in a virtual machine written in C. This work was used by the Verisoft project to verify the code of an hypervisor consisting of mixed low-level code. Maus' technique relies on VCC [38] to write and prove verification conditions regarding the state of its machine. While we strive to produced high-level code, Maus' virtual code contains all low-level code details, including flags.
Further work by Schmaltz and Shadrin [39] aims (only) at proving the ABI compliance of the assembly chunks. This method is however restricted to MASM and the Windows operating system. TINA, here applied to GCC inline assembly, is independent of the assembly dialect by leveraging binary level analyzers and is applicable to a wider range of architectures.
Fehnker et al. [40] tackle the analysis of inline assembly for ARM architecture, using a model-checking based syntactic analysis to integrate C/C ++ analyses with inline assembly. This solution is however limited by its purely syntactic basis: first, it is restricted to one single inline assembly dialect; second it loses the soundness properties we target. Losing soundness may be an appropriate practical trade-off but not when targeting sound formal analyses.
Corteggiani et al. [14] also use code lifting within their framework. However, their end goal is to perform dynamic symbolic analyses on the produced lifted code. Sec. VII-B shows that such very targeted lifting may not be enough for other formal analyses. Moreover, correctness of the translation is not addressed.
Myreen et al. [41] targets verification of pure assembly code. The translation corresponds to our basic lifter, yet the approach proves the initial lifted IR is semantically equivalent to a very detailed ISA model. This paper then targets verification at the level of assembly code but requires code annotations and interactive proving. Our proposal targets the lifting of inline assembly within C for (general) verification purposes, is geared at ensuring the verifiability of the produced code, and its validation establishes the correctness of the IR transformations producing the final extracted C code.
Decompilation. Decompilation [15] , [16] , [17] tackles the challenge of recovering the original source code (or a similar one) from an executable. This goal is very difficult and requires hard work to find back the information lost during compilation [42] . Despite significant recent progress [19] , decompilation remains an open challenge. Still, it is used to enhance program understanding, e.g., during reverse engineering. As such, correctness is not the main concern -for example it does not always need produce compilable source code.
Soundness is addressed by two recent works. Schulte et al. [18] use search-based techniques to generate source-code producing byte-equivalent binaries to the original executable. This technique, when it succeeds, ensures soundness by design but it is only applied to small examples, with limited success. Brumley et al. [19] on the other hand use testing to increase trust in their lifted code.
We do draw inspiration from some decompilation techniques for type reconstruction [43] , [44] . Even though we do not construct types that are not derived from inputs, it helps in strengthening our type system.
Recovering the instructions and CFG of the code under analysis is a big challenge in decompilation [45] , [46] , especially for adversarial codes like malware. The regularity and patterns of managed codes allow a very good recovery in practice [43] by unsound methods, yet without any guarantee. Inline assembly chunks have more limited behaviors (clear control-flow, no dynamic jumps) and the fact that we control compilation makes it a non-issue for us.
Binary-level program analysis. For more than a decade now, the program analysis community has spent significant efforts on binary-level codes [47] , either to analyze source-less programs (malware, COTS) or to check the code that is really running. The efforts have mainly been concerned with safe high-level abstraction recovery [48] , [49] , [50] , [29] , [51] and invariant computation.
Several generic binary lifters have been produced [20] , [21] , [22] , reducing complex ISAs to a small set of semantically well-defined primitives. Though well tested [22] , more trust could be achieved if lifters were automatically derived from something akin to ARM's formal specifications [52] .
Mixed code problems. Morrisett et al. [53] have proposed Typed Assembly Language to ensure memory and control flow integrity in low-level assembly. Patterson et al. [54] have exploited the idea to mix low-level code with functional languages. We borrow some elements to propagate types between C and inline assembly.
Translation validation and code equivalence. In order to achieve safe lifting, we use translation validation [55] , [23] , [56] , a technique also used in CompCert register allocation [57] . Our formal needs thus rely on well-established and tested tools (here SMT solvers), usable as blackboxes, instead of a full formal proof of the whole lifting chain.
Program equivalence checking is considered a challenging verification task. Dedicated approaches start to emerge, like relational weakest precondition calculus [58] (for proof) or relational symbolic execution [59] (for bug finding).
X. CONCLUSION
We have presented TINA, a method enabling the analysis of C/C ++ code mixed with inline assembly, by lifting the assembly chunks to equivalent C code. This method is the first to generate well-structured C code amenable to formal analysis through a dedicated principled succession of transformations geared at improving the verifiability of the produced code. To boot, translation validation builds trust into the lifting process. Thorough experiments on real-world code show that TINA is widely applicable (100% of in-scope chunks from Linux Debian Jessie 8.11 are validated) and that its semantic transformations positively (and significantly) impact popular verification techniques.
